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Abstract
Status	beliefs	link	social	distinctions,	such	as	gender	and	race,	to	assumptions	about	competence	and	social	worth.	Recent	modeling	work	in	status
construction	theory	suggests	that	interactions	in	small,	task	focused	groups	can	lead	to	the	spontaneous	emergence	and	diffusion	of	such	beliefs	in	larger
populations.	This	earlier	work	has	focused	on	dyads	as	the	smallest	possible	groups	in	which	status	beliefs	might	emerge	from	face-to-face	interaction.	In
today's	societies,	however,	many	task	focused	interactions	take	place	in	groups	larger	than	dyads.	In	this	article,	we	therefore	develop	an	agent-based
computational	model	that	enables	us	to	study	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs	in	groups	larger	than	dyads.	With	this	model,	we	address	questions	such	as:	Do
basic	principles	of	task	focused	interaction	systematically	favor	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs	in	groups	larger	than	dyads?	Does	the	time-frame	over	which
small	groups	interact	affect	the	likelihood	with	which	status	beliefs	emerge?	How	does	group	size	affect	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs?	Computational
experimentation	with	the	new	model	suggests	that	behavioral	principles	known	to	spontaneously	create	hierarchical	differentiation	between	individual	group
members	also	tend	to	align	these	hierarchies	with	categorical	differences	and	thereby	facilitate	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs.	This	tendency	is	stronger	in
smaller	groups,	and	in	groups	that	interact	either	for	a	very	short	or	very	long	time.
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Introduction
1.1 	Men	are	frequently	expected	to	be	better	at	math	than	women	(Nosek,	Banaji,	&	Greenwald	2002),	white	students	are	often	assumed	to	perform	better	than
black	students	(Steele	&	Aronson	1995),	and	physically	attractive	people	are	often	assumed	to	be	more	competent	than	unattractive	people	(Jackson,	Hunter,	&
Hodge	1995).	Each	of	these	observations	illustrates	how	status	characteristics	can	affect	the	abilities	and	skills	that	others	expect	us	to	possess.	A	status
characteristic	is	any	social	distinction	that	separates	individuals	into	at	least	two	categories	that	are	believed	to	differ	in	social	worth	and	general	competence
(Berger,	Fisek,	Norman,	&	Zelditch	1977).	Status	characteristics	shape	interactions	and	are	an	important	source	of	inequality.	Social	scientists	therefore	have	a
long-standing	interest	in	explaining	how	social	distinctions	attain	status	value	(e.g.,	Balkwell	&	Balswick	1981;	Hendrix	&	Hossain	1988;	Stover	&	Hope	1984).
1.2 	A	classical	explanation	for	the	creation	of	status	characteristics	is	based	on	statistical	association	(e.g.,	Bielby	&	Baron	1986;	Phelps	1972).	According	to	this
reasoning,	a	trait	like	gender	can	become	a	status	characteristic	if	members	of	one	gender	are	on	average	more	resourceful	in	terms	of	income,	education,	and
competence	than	members	of	the	other	gender.
1.3 	More	recently,	Mark,	Smith-Lovin,	&	Ridgeway	(2009)	described	a	mechanism	by	which	social	distinctions	can	attain	status	value,	even	in	the	absence	of
resource	differences	between	members	of	different	categories.	Drawing	on	status	construction	theory	(SCT)	(e.g.,	Ridgeway	1991,	2000;	Webster	&	Hysom
1998)	and	related	research	on	the	emergence	of	status	hierarchies	in	task	focused	groups	(Bales	1950,	1970),	Mark	et	al.	highlighted	that	task	focused	groups
can	spontaneously	develop	hierarchies	of	influence	and	deference	in	which	some	individuals	appear	more	competent	than	others,	even	when	this	is	objectively
not	the	case.	When	hierarchical	differentiation	occurs	consistently	between	members	of	different	social	categories,	group	members	can	come	to	believe	that	the
distinction	generally	coincides	with	competence	differences.	Once	emerged,	such	beliefs	can	diffuse	throughout	the	population,	because	individuals	carry	them
into	new	group	contexts,	treat	new	interaction	partners	accordingly,	and	thereby	create	hierarchies	that	teach	their	beliefs	to	others.	By	that,	status	beliefs	can
both	emerge	and	spread,	even	when	there	are	no	objective	resource	differences	between	members	of	the	different	social	categories.
1.4 	In	their	formal	modeling	efforts,	Mark	et	al.	(2009)	focused	on	dyads	as	the	smallest	possible	groups	in	which	hierarchical	differentiation	can	occur.	Focusing	on
dyads	is	a	useful	starting	point	for	examining	status	construction	processes,	because	it	allows	us	to	abstract	from	some	of	the	complex	interaction	dynamics	that
might	develop	in	larger	groups.	For	instance,	in	dyads,	any	hierarchical	differentiation	that	might	emerge	is	necessarily	fully	aligned	with	any	social	distinction
that	differentiates	group	members.	This	enables	us	to	abstract	from	more	complex	hierarchical	structures	that	might	arise	in	larger	groups	and	that	might
provide	partially	contradicting	information	about	competence	differences	between	members	of	different	social	categories.	However,	many	of	the	task	focused
interactions	that	take	place	in	today's	societies	occur	in	groups	larger	than	dyads.	If	we	want	to	assess	the	importance	of	status	construction	in	the	creation	of
social	inequality,	we	need	to	understand	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs	under	such	more	complex	conditions.[1]
1.5 	In	this	article,	we	contribute	to	research	in	SCT	by	developing	an	agent-based	computational	model	that	combines	insights	into	hierarchy	formation	in	groups
larger	than	dyads	(e.g.,	Fisek,	Berger	&	Norman	1991)	with	insights	into	status	belief	formation	(e.g.,	Ridgeway	&	Correll	2006).	By	that,	we	complement	Mark	et
al.'s	(2009)	study	of	belief	diffusion	at	the	population	level	with	a	study	of	the	factors	that	might	facilitate	belief	emergence	at	the	group	level.	We	address
questions	such	as:	Do	basic	principles	of	task	focused	interaction	systematically	favor	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs	in	groups	larger	than	dyads?	Does	the
time-frame	over	which	small	groups	interact	affect	the	likelihood	with	which	status	beliefs	emerge?	How	does	group	size	affect	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs?
1.6 	To	preview	results,	our	computational	experiments	suggest	that	behavioral	principles	known	to	spontaneously	create	hierarchical	differentiation	between
individual	group	members	also	tend	to	align	these	hierarchies	with	categorical	differences	and	thereby	facilitate	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs.	Formulated
differently,	our	results	suggest	that	task	focused	interaction	in	small	groups	might	have	an	inherent	tendency	to	create	conditions	that	facilitate	the	emergence
of	status	beliefs.	This	tendency	is	stronger	in	smaller	groups,	and	in	groups	that	interact	either	for	a	very	short	or	very	long	time.
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1.7 	In	what	follows,	we	first	describe	the	theory	that	underlies	our	model.	Next,	we	present	the	model	itself	and	subsequently	submit	it	to	systematic	computational
experiments.	We	close	the	article	with	presenting	the	results	of	our	experiments	and	discussing	their	implications	for	future	research.
Task	Focused	Interaction	and	the	Formation	of	Status	Beliefs
2.1 	SCT	is	part	of	the	expectation	states	framework	–	a	set	of	theories	that	examine	the	emergence	of	hierarchical	differentiation	in	newly	established	groups	with	a
collective	task	focus	(for	overviews	of	the	framework	see	Correll	&	Ridgeway	2003	and	Wagner	&	Berger	2002).	In	this	framework,	hierarchical	differentiation	is
defined	as	inequalities	in	task	participation	and	influence	among	group	members;	collective	task	focus	means	that	group	members	perceive	successful	task
completion	as	their	primary	goal	and	that	success	can	only	be	reached	through	team	work	(cf.	Berger	et	al.	1977,	1980).	Those	group	members	who	are
relatively	more	active	on	the	task	and	whose	opinions	have	more	weight	in	decision	making	processes	hold	higher	positions	in	the	group's	hierarchy.
2.2 	Examples	of	groups	that	fit	the	framework's	scope	are	student	learning	groups	and	work	teams.	The	tasks	that	such	groups	have	to	fulfill	might	vary
considerably.	We	focus	on	small	discussion	groups	as	a	prototype	of	task	groups	that	has	frequently	been	studied	in	empirical	research	and	simulation	studies.
The	members	of	such	groups	have	to	develop	a	solution	for	a	complex	problem	that	might	not	have	an	objectively	correct	solution.	Theoretical	and	empirical
research	in	SCT	has	focused	on	social	distinctions	that	create	two	categories	(e.g.,	gender	with	the	categories	man	and	woman).	We	follow	this	tradition	here
and	refer	to	members	of	the	different	categories	with	the	letters	A	and	B.	Throughout	this	article	we	make	the	assumption	that	this	characteristic	is	salient	and	is
the	only	attribute	that	initially	differentiates	group	members.
2.3 	Drawing	on	the	expectation	states	framework,	we	first	review	behavioral	processes	that	can	lead	to	the	emergence	of	hierarchical	differentiation,	even	in	the
absence	of	resource	and	competence	differences	among	group	members.	Subsequently,	we	review	how	the	observation	of	consistent	hierarchical
differentiation	between	members	of	different	social	categories	can	lead	to	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs.	Finally,	we	discuss	how	small	group	interaction	might
bring	such	consistency,	and	thereby	status	beliefs,	about.
The	emergence	of	hierarchical	differentiation
2.4 	The	expectation	states	framework	builds	on	the	notion	that	when	previously	unacquainted	individuals	meet	in	a	group	setting	with	a	collective	task	focus,	"they
act	as	if	one	of	the	subtasks	of	the	group	is	to	decide	who	has	high	and	who	has	low	ability	at	the	task	–	thus	to	take	advantage	of	high	ability	members	and	not
be	misled	by	low	ability	members"	(Driskell	1982,	p.	232).	Assumptions	about	relative	abilities	are	represented	by	so-called	performance	expectations	(Berger
et	al.	1977)	that	group	members	hold	for	each	other.
2.5 	Performance	expectations	affect	the	way	group	members	coordinate	their	work	on	the	task	(Balkwell	1991a;	Berger,	Rosenholtz	&	Zelditch	1980;	Driskell
1982).	First,	those	who	are	expected	to	perform	relatively	better	than	others	are	more	likely	to	receive	performance	opportunities.	This	means	that	they	are	more
often	asked	for	their	opinion,	more	often	receive	the	opportunity	to	make	suggestions,	and	are	given	more	time	to	elaborate	their	views.	Second,	the
contributions	of	those	who	are	expected	to	perform	relatively	better	receive	more	positive	performance	evaluations.	This	means	that	even	when	their
suggestions	are	qualitatively	similar	to	the	suggestions	of	group	members	for	whom	performance	expectations	are	relatively	lower,	their	suggestions	are	still
more	likely	to	be	accepted	and	appreciated.
2.6 	When	individuals	lack	objective	information	about	each	other's	competence,	they	look	for	cues	that	might	provide	such	information.	The	two	cues	that	are
relevant	in	the	context	of	this	article	are	status	characteristics	and	behavior	interchange	patterns	(Fisek	et	al.	1991;	Webster	&	Rashotte	2010).	Status
characteristics	are	connected	to	beliefs	about	competence	differences	between	members	of	different	social	categories.	For	instance,	when	gender	is	a	status
characteristic	that	favors	men	over	women,	individuals	tend	to	believe	that	men	are	generally	more	competent	than	women.	Performance	expectations	therefore
tend	to	be	higher	for	male	than	for	female	group	members.	Behavior	interchange	patterns	are	interactions	among	group	members	that	might	indicate
competence	differences	between	them.	For	instance,	when	group	member	A1	appreciates	and	accepts	the	suggestions	of	group	member	A2,	whereas	A2
criticizes	and	rejects	A1's	suggestions,	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	becomes	established	in	which	A2	appears	more	competent	than	A1.	As	a	consequence,
group	members	are	more	likely	to	pay	attention	to	A2's	suggestions,	even	compared	to	other	group	members	A3,	A4,	and	A5,	who	were	not	themselves	involved
in	the	interaction.	Conversely,	group	members	are	likely	to	pay	less	attention	to	A1's	suggestions,	even	compared	to	other	group	members.
2.7 	Both	status	characteristics	and	behavior	interchange	patterns	tend	to	create	stable	hierarchical	differentiation	between	group	members,	even	in	the	absence	of
objective	competence	differences.	When	there	are	status	differences	between	social	categories	from	the	outset,	the	relatively	higher	performance	expectations
that	group	members	have	for	members	of	a	status	advantaged	category	will	lead	the	members	of	this	category	to	dominate	group	interaction	(Berger	et	al.
1977).	In	the	absence	of	salient	status	characteristics,	group	members	who	manage	to	make	suggestions	that	are	accepted	by	other	group	members	in	an	early
phase	of	group	interaction	increase	the	performance	expectations	that	others	have	for	them.	This	leads	to	a	"self-fulfilling	prophecy"	(Meeker	1994,	p.	107)	in
which	they	become	more	likely	to	receive	subsequent	performance	opportunities	and	their	subsequent	suggestions	are	more	likely	to	be	evaluated	positively.
This	implies	that	small,	randomly	created	status	differences	tend	to	grow	and	become	stable	over	time.
The	emergence	of	status	beliefs
2.8 	Individuals	tend	to	infer	competence	differences	from	behavior	interchange	patterns.	When	such	patterns	are	juxtaposed	with	differences	in	a	salient	social
distinction	(e.g.,	men	generally	accept	the	suggestions	of	women,	whereas	women	generally	reject	the	suggestions	of	men),	there	is	a	chance	that	group
members	"misattribute"	(Webster	&	Hysom	1998,	p.	357)	seeming	competence	differences	to	differences	in	the	distinction.	That	is,	they	acquire	status	beliefs
that	turn	the	distinction	into	a	status	characteristic.
2.9 	The	likelihood	with	which	such	belief	acquisition	takes	place	depends	on	how	comprehensively	and	consistently	the	social	distinction	is	associated	with
apparent	competence	differences	(Ridgeway	2000,	pp.	96–97).	Comprehensive	means	that	individuals	have	observed	a	number	of	behavior	interchange
patterns	between	different	members	of	different	social	categories	(Ridgeway	2000).	Consistent	means	that	in	these	patterns	members	of	one	category
generally	appeared	in	the	higher	competence	role,	whereas	members	of	the	respective	other	category	almost	invariably	appeared	in	the	lower	competence	role
(Ridgeway	2000;	Ridgeway	&	Correll	2006).	When	both	conditions	are	fulfilled,	individuals	tend	to	have	little	doubt	about	the	observed	association	and	are	thus
likely	to	acquire	a	corresponding	status	belief.
2.10 	Even	when	individuals	doubt	an	observed	association	between	categorical	differences	and	relative	competence,	they	have	reason	to	act	as	if	they	would
personally	believe	it.	Consistent	displays	of	influence	and	deference	between	members	of	different	categories	imply	some	degree	of	consensus	among	others
as	to	who	should	assume	leadership	roles	and	who	should	have	the	chance	to	contribute	to	important	collective	tasks	(Ridgeway	&	Correll	2006).	Acting	against
such	consensus	bears	the	risk	of	social	"backlash"	(Ridgeway	et	al.	2009:	47)	that	can	incur	significant	costs	for	the	individual.	This	creates	a	subjective
incentive	to	comply	with	the	perceived	consensus.
The	emergence	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	between	social	categories
2.11 	As	highlighted	earlier,	Mark	et	al.	(2009)	focused	on	dyads	as	the	smallest	possible	group	in	which	hierarchical	differentiation	can	emerge.	If	there	are	only	two
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individuals	and	if	these	individuals	differ	in	a	salient	social	distinction,	any	hierarchy	that	emerges	will	consistently	favor	one	of	the	two	categories	to	which	they
belong.	In	larger	groups,	more	complex	hierarchical	structures	can	emerge	and	these	structures	might	undermine	belief	formation.	Additionally,	the	outcome	of
an	interaction	among	two	group	members	not	only	affects	the	performance	expectations	that	these	group	members	have	for	each	other;	also	the	performance
expectations	of	the	remaining	group	members	will	be	affected.	To	date,	it	has	remained	unexplored	how	this	increased	complexity	affects	status	construction
processes.
2.12 	We	expect	that	interaction	in	task	focused	groups,	as	described	in	the	expectation	states	framework,	has	a	tendency	to	create	consistent	hierarchical
differentiation	between	members	of	different	social	categories,	even	in	groups	larger	than	dyads.	More	specifically,	we	expect	that	the	structuring	effects	that
behavior	interchange	patterns	can	have	on	interactions	tend	to	create	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	between	members	of	different	social	categories.	A
thought	experiment	helps	understanding	why.
2.13 	Imagine	a	group	of	six	individuals,	three	belonging	to	category	A	and	three	belonging	to	category	B.	Assume	that	B1	has	made	a	suggestion	for	solving	the	task
to	A1	and	that	after	some	arguing	A1	has	accepted	this	suggestion.	This	establishes	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	between	them,	which	increases	group
members'	performance	expectations	for	B1	and	decreases	their	performance	expectations	for	A1,	relatively	to	the	rest	of	the	group.	As	a	consequence,	the
likelihood	that	B1	will	make	a	subsequent	suggestion	increases	and	when	such	a	suggestion	is	directed	at	A2	or	A3,	it	is	more	likely	than	before	to	be	accepted.
When	this	happens,	the	initial	inequality	among	members	of	different	categories,	as	observed	in	the	interaction	between	A1	and	B1,	is	reproduced	and
strengthened.	Similarly,	the	likelihood	that	A1	will	make	a	subsequent	suggestion	decreases	and	when	such	a	suggestion	is	directed	at	B2	or	B3,	it	is	more	likely
than	before	to	be	rejected.	Also	in	this	case,	the	initially	observed	inequality	between	members	of	different	categories	is	reproduced	and	strengthened.
2.14 	Evidently,	the	information	that	initially	supports	the	belief	that	Bs	are	more	competent	than	As	is	only	based	on	the	interaction	between	B1	and	A1	and	is	thus	not
very	comprehensive.	Therefore	it	is	not	very	likely	to	induce	status	beliefs	among	group	members.	However,	as	more	As	are	cast	into	lower	hierarchical
positions	through	their	interactions	with	B1,	and	as	more	Bs	are	cast	into	higher	hierarchical	positions	through	their	interactions	with	A1,	more	information
supporting	the	observed	association	becomes	available,	increasing	the	likelihood	that	group	members	will	acquire	a	corresponding	status	belief.
2.15 	In	sum,	we	expect	that	the	processes	that	can	lead	to	hierarchical	differentiation	between	individual	group	members	have	the	tendency	to	create	consistent
hierarchical	differentiation	between	members	of	different	social	categories	and	thereby	facilitate	the	formation	of	status	beliefs.	However,	our	thought	experiment
disregards	other	possible	interactions	in	the	group,	such	as	between	B2	and	A2/A3	or	between	B3	and	A2/A3.	Such	interactions	might	lead	to	the	development	of
subsequent	behavior	interchange	patterns	that	further	support	or	undermine	the	belief	that	Bs	are	more	competent	than	As	and	the	possible	number	of	such
interactions	quickly	increases	with	group	size.	Given	this	complexity,	our	intuitive	reasoning	leaves	open	how	likely	it	is	that	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation
between	social	categories	arises	from	the	fundamental	behavioral	processes	that	the	expectation	states	framework	describes	and	how	this	is	affected	by	group
size.
2.16 	To	shed	more	light	on	this,	we	developed	an	agent-based	computational	model	that	we	submitted	to	systematic	computational	experiments.	This	approach	is
particularly	useful	for	studying	emergent	properties	of	complex	human	interaction	systems	(Bonabeau	2002;	Macy	&	Flache	2009)	and	has	already	provided
valuable	insights	into	status	dynamics	in	small	groups	(for	example	see	Lynn,	Podolny	&	Tao	2009;	Skvoretz	&	Fararo	1996).	Our	model	builds	on	the	notion
that	task	focused	interaction	can	be	broken	down	into	cyclic	patterns	(cf.	Fisek	et	al.	1991)	and	draws	on	earlier	formalizations	of	task	focused	interaction
(Balkwell	1991a;	Skvoretz	&	Fararo	1996).	Panel	(a)	of	Figure	1	illustrates	the	basic	cycle	that	we	use	in	our	model.	It	starts	with	group	members'	mutual
competence	assessments	that	are	represented	by	performance	expectations.	These	expectations	determine	the	probability	that	a	given	group	member	receives
a	performance	opportunity,	in	the	form	of	making	a	suggestion	towards	another	group	member.	This	suggestion,	in	turn,	receives	a	performance	evaluation	in
the	form	of	acceptance	or	rejection	by	the	receiver.	The	outcome	of	this	evaluation	can	lead	to	the	establishment	of	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	between	the
sender	and	the	receiver	of	the	suggestion.	Subsequently,	the	structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	feeds	back	into	performance	expectations	and	can	lead
to	the	formation	of	status	beliefs	among	group	members.
Figure	1.	Conceptual	representation	of	the	interaction	cycles	used	in	three	different	versions	of	the	model.	Arrows	indicate	causal	links.	Panel	(a):	basic	interaction
model;	panel	(b):	extended	interaction	model;	panel	(c):	random	interaction	model.
2.17 	One	question	that	has	not	been	addressed	in	SCT	research	so	far	is	how	status	beliefs	affect	the	interactions	in	the	groups	in	which	they	have	been	acquired.
That	is,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	there	are	no	studies	that	have	examined	how	the	experience	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	between,	say,	men
and	women	in	a	given	group	affects	the	performance	expectations	that	group	members	have	for	each	other,	if	gender	previously	had	no	status	value.	If	beliefs
would	affect	performance	expectations	in	the	context	in	which	they	had	been	acquired,	this	might	greatly	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	the	behavior
interchange	patterns	that	led	to	their	emergence.	In	this	way,	status	beliefs	might	contribute	to	their	own	reinforcement.	For	our	core	argument,	such	an
additional	reinforcing	process	is	not	necessary,	because	the	argument	relies	on	a	reinforcing	process	induced	by	behavior	interchange	patterns	alone.	However,
we	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	that	status	beliefs	might	affect	the	performance	expectations	in	the	groups	in	which	they	have	been	acquired.	We	therefore
also	explore	this	possibility.
2.18 	To	do	so,	we	implemented	three	versions	of	our	model.	Panel	(a)	in	Figure	1	shows	the	model	that	enables	us	to	test	our	basic	argument.	In	this	model,
performance	expectations	are	exclusively	affected	by	behavior	interchange	patterns	between	individual	group	members.	Status	beliefs	can	emerge,	but	they	do
not	affect	performance	expectations	in	the	group	in	which	they	have	been	acquired.	We	call	this	the	basic	interaction	model.	Panel	(b)	shows	a	less
conservative	model	in	which	status	beliefs	can	affect	performance	expectations	on	top	of	behavior	interchange	patterns.	We	call	this	the	extended	interaction
model.	We	assess	the	relative	impact	that	behavior	interchange	patterns	and	status	beliefs	have	on	the	likelihood	with	which	consistent	differentiation	emerges
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by	comparing	the	outcomes	that	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	create	with	the	outcome	of	a	model	in	which	performance
expectations	are	unaffected	by	behavior	interchange	patterns	and	status	beliefs.	In	this	model,	interactions	essentially	occur	at	random	and	this	enables	us	to
examine	how	much	the	behavioral	principles	that	we	study	contribute	to	the	likelihood	that	consistent	differentiation	emerges,	over	and	above	pure	chance.	This
random	interaction	model	is	shown	in	panel	(c).	Earlier	modeling	work	has	used	similar	approaches	to	choose	a	baseline	model	for	assessing	how	different
social	mechanisms	affect	social	structures	(cf.	Skvoretz,	Faust	&	Fararo	1996).
Modeling	Task	Focused	Interaction
3.1 	In	this	section	we	describe	the	agent-based	model.	It	was	implemented	in	NetLogo	version	5.0.5	(Wilensky	1999).	The	model	code	can	be	downloaded	here:
https://www.openabm.org/model/4216/version/3.	Table	1	and	Table	2	provide	an	overview	of	the	model’s	parameters	and	variables.
Table	1:	Run-time	settable	model	parameters
Parameter Description
I Number	of	agents	in	the	group.
IA,	IB Number	of	agents	in	the	group	with	the	states	A	and	B	on	the	nominal	social	distinction	Ni.
γ Governs	the	effect	that	differences	in	agents'	expectation	standings	Ei	have	on	interaction	probabilities	in	the
group.
δ Governs	the	effect	that	agents'	expectation	standings	Ei	have	on	the	probability	that	the	suggestion	of	a	given	agent
i	will	be	accepted/rejected	by	another	agent	j.
c Threshold	that	r	needs	to	pass	for	agents	to	acquire	or	maintain	status	beliefs.
a Probability	with	which	agents	adopt	a	status	belief	when	r	(-r)	passes	the	threshold	c	(-c).
l Probability	with	which	agents	loose	a	status	belief	when	r	(-r)	fails	to	pass	the	threshold	c	(-c).
Table	2:	Agent-,	dyad-,	and	group-level	variables
Variable Description Level
Ni Agent	i's	state	on	a	nominal	social	distinction. Agent
Si Agent	i's	status	belief	that	indicates	which	state	of	Ni	it	believes	to	be	associated	with	higher	competence. Agent
bij A	directed	tie	between	i	and	j	that	represents	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	between	them.	The	direction	and
weight	of	bij	indicates	which	of	the	two	agents	appeared	more	often	in	the	higher	competence	role	in	their
dyadic	interactions.
Dyad
#negij,
#posij
Pieces	of	information	that	agent	i	perceives	to	suggest	that	agent	j	is	less	(neg)	or	more	(pos)	competent	than
other	group	members.
Dyad
eij Performance	expectation	that	agent	i	has	for	agent	j. Dyad
e*ji Average	performance	expectation	that	all	group	members	have	for	agent	i. Group
Ei Expectation	standing	that	agent	i	has	in	the	group. Group
comp Comprehensiveness	of	past	interactions	in	the	group	that	might	be	indicative	of	competence	differences
between	members	of	the	categories	A	and	B.
Group
#bij,A-,
#bij,A+,
#bij,A0
Number	of	behavior	interchange	patterns/ties	bij	in	which	members	of	category	A	took	the	lower	(-),	higher
(+),	or	the	same	(0)	competence	role	in	their	interactions	with	members	of	category	B.
Group
cons Consistency	with	which	behavior	interchange	patterns/ties	bij	support	different	status	beliefs. Group
r Measure	of	how	much	comp	and	cons	together	support	different	status	beliefs. Group
Agents	and	their	characteristics
3.2 	We	assume	groups	with	I	individuals	that	are	represented	by	agents	i.	There	is	one	nominal	social	distinction	Ni	that	separates	agents	into	two	categories,	As
and	Bs	(Ni	∈	{A;B}).	This	distinction	can	be	imagined	to	represent	gender	with	the	categories	man	and	woman,	or	skin-color	with	the	categories	white	and	black.
The	numbers	of	agents	with	each	characteristic	in	a	given	group	are	indicated	by	IA	and	IB	(I	=	IA+	IB).	Each	agent	has	a	status	belief	Si	related	to	this	distinction
that	can	take	one	of	the	three	states	A,	O,	and	B	(Si	∈	{A;O;B}).	When	Si	=	A	or	Si	=	B,	agent	i	believes	that	agents	with	the	corresponding	state	on	Ni	are	more
competent	than	agents	with	the	other	state;	from	here	on	we	refer	to	agents	with	either	state	on	Si	also	as	'agents	with	status	beliefs'.	Si	=	O	indicates	that	i	does
not	believe	that	agents	who	differ	in	Ni	also	differ	in	competence;	from	here	on,	we	refer	to	agents	with	this	state	on	Si	also	as	'agents	without	status	beliefs'.
Performance	expectations
3.3 	Agents'	performance	expectations	for	each	other	can	have	two	sources:	behavior	interchange	patterns	and	status	beliefs.	In	the	basic	interaction	model,	only
behavior	interchange	patterns	affect	performance	expectations.	In	the	extended	interaction	model,	behavior	interchange	patterns	and	status	beliefs	affect
performance	expectations.	In	the	random	interaction	model,	performance	expectations	are	not	affected	by	these	factors	and	interactions	occur	at	random.
3.4 	A	behavior	interchange	pattern	is	established	between	two	agents	whenever	one	of	them	accepts	or	rejects	the	suggestion	of	the	other	during	discussion.	For
instance,	when	agent	i	for	the	first	time	directs	a	suggestion	at	agent	j	and	j	accepts	this	suggestion,	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	becomes	established	in
which	i	appears	more	competent	than	j.	However,	when	j	rejects	this	suggestion,	i	appears	less	competent	than	j.	The	more	often	their	interactions	cast	one	of
them	into	the	more	competent	position	and	the	other	in	the	less	competent	position,	the	more	stable	the	behavior	interchange	pattern	becomes	and	the	more
difficult	it	becomes	to	remove.	That	is,	when	in	virtually	all	their	past	interactions	agent	i	appeared	more	competent	than	agent	j,	a	single	interaction	that
contradicts	this	pattern	is	not	enough	to	undermine	the	impression	that	i	is	generally	more	competent	than	j.
3.5 	More	technically,	we	model	the	structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	in	a	group	as	a	directed	graph	with	weighted	ties	between	agents.	Whenever	two
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agents	interact	for	the	first	time,	a	tie	bij	is	created	between	them.	Initially	bij	is	undirected	and	has	a	weight	of	0.	When	the	outcome	of	i	and	j's	first	interaction
suggests	that,	say,	i	is	more	competent	than	j,	bij	becomes	directed	with	i	as	the	source	and	j	as	the	sink	and	its	weight	becomes	1.	Each	subsequent	interaction
between	i	and	j	that	supports	the	current	behavior	interchange	pattern	increases	the	weight	of	bij	by	1;	each	subsequent	interaction	that	contradicts	the	pattern
decreases	the	weight	by	1.	When	a	tie	takes	the	weight	0,	which	is	the	case	when	on	average	none	of	the	two	agents	appeared	more	or	less	often	competent,
the	tie	becomes	undirected	again.	When	after	this	change	one	of	the	two	agents	appears	in	the	higher	competence	role	in	the	next	interaction,	the	tie	is
assigned	a	new	directionality	and	its	weight	is	changed	accordingly.
3.6 	Status	beliefs	affect	performance	expectations	(in	the	extended	interaction	model)	so	that,	from	i's	point	of	view,	expectations	increase	for	those	agents	who
belong	to	the	category	which	it	believes	to	be	generally	more	competent.	They	decrease	for	those	agents	that	belong	to	the	category	which	i	believes	to	be
generally	less	competent.	This	also	applies	to	i	itself.
3.7 	According	to	the	expectation	states	framework,	individuals	tend	to	balance	contradicting	information	from	multiple	behavior	interchange	patterns	and	status
beliefs.	In	this	balancing	process,	the	weight	of	status	beliefs	is	similar	to	the	weight	of	a	single	behavior	interchange	pattern	(Webster	&	Rashotte	2010).
Furthermore,	given	a	set	of	observations	that	suggest	that	a	particular	group	member	is	(not)	very	competent,	additional	information	that	further	supports	this
perception	has	a	decreasing	marginal	effect	on	performance	expectations.	This	has	been	referred	to	as	the	attenuation	effect	(Berger	et	al.	1977).	Based	on
this,	we	calculate	the	performance	expectation	eij	that	agent	i	has	for	j	at	moment	t	as
(1)
where	Eq.	(1),	#negij	and	#posij	are	pieces	of	information	that,	from	i's	point	of	view,	imply	that	j	has	low	or	high	competence	respectively.	Using	#negij	and
#posij	in	the	exponent	with	a	base	smaller	than	one	implements	the	attenuation	effect;	the	value	of	eij	is	restricted	to	the	range	-1	<	eij	<	1.	Appendix	A	provides	a
detailed	discussion	of	how	we	arrived	at	Eq.	(1)	based	on	existing	research.
3.8 	As	indicated	above,	the	three	versions	of	our	model	differ	in	the	pieces	of	information	that	affect	performance	expectations.	In	the	basic	interaction	model,	each
behavior	interchange	pattern/tie	bij	in	which	j	appears	in	the	higher	competence	role	increases	the	value	of	#posij	by	one.	Each	pattern	in	which	it	appears	in	the
lower	competence	role	increases	the	value	of	#negij	by	one.	In	the	extended	interaction	model,	#posij	additionally	increases	by	one	if	j	belongs	to	a	social
category	that	i	believes	to	be	generally	more	competent.	Conversely,	#negij	decreases	by	one	if	j	belongs	to	a	social	category	that	i	believes	to	be	generally	less
competent.	In	the	random	interaction	model,	#negij	and	#posij	are	always	equal	to	zero,	so	that	all	agents	always	have	the	same	performance	expectations	for
all	group	members.
3.9 	Note	that	we	assume	that	all	agents	perceive	the	behavior	interchange	patterns	that	develop	in	the	group	in	the	same	way.	In	the	basic	interaction	model	the
performance	expectations	that	different	group	members	have	for	a	particular	agent	are	thus	the	same.	In	the	extended	interaction	model,	these	expectations
can	vary	when	there	is	variation	in	group	members'	status	beliefs.
Performance	opportunities	and	performance	evaluations
3.10 	Figure	1	illustrates	that	task	focused	interaction	proceeds	in	two	steps.	First,	one	group	member	receives	a	performance	opportunity	in	the	form	of	directing	a
suggestion	at	another	agent.	Subsequently,	the	receiver	of	this	suggestion	makes	a	performance	evaluation	in	which	it	either	accepts	or	rejects	the	suggestion.
Both	the	probability	that	a	given	agent	makes	a	suggestion	to	a	particular	other	agent	and	the	probability	that	this	suggestion	is	accepted	or	rejected	by	the
receiver	depend	on	the	agents'	relative	expectation	standings	in	the	group.	Those	agents	for	whom	group	members	on	average	have	higher	expectations	than
for	the	rest	of	the	group	are	more	likely	to	be	involved	in	an	interaction,	either	as	the	sender	or	receiver	of	a	suggestion.	They	are	also	more	likely	to	have	their
suggestions	accepted	by	their	interaction	partners.
3.11 	Technically,	e*ji	represents	the	average	performance	expectation	that	all	group	members,	including	i,	have	for	i.	We	transform	this	value	(non-linearly)	to	be
positive	and	smaller	than	1.
(2)
where	Ei	represents	the	expectation	standing	of	agent	i	in	the	group.	Based	on	this,	in	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model,	the
sender	of	a	suggestion	is	randomly	selected	from	the	set	of	all	group	members	with	a	probability	proportional	to	Eγi.	Subsequently,	the	receiver	of	this
suggestion	is	randomly	selected	from	the	set	of	remaining	group	members,	also	with	a	probability	proportional	to	Eγi.	In	both	cases,	γ	(γ	≥	0)	is	an	exogenous
weighting	factor	that	enables	us	to	control	the	extent	to	which	interactions	concentrate	among	the	higher	ranking	group	members.	When	γ	=	0,	performance
expectations	do	not	affect	the	interaction	probabilities	among	agents	and	all	group	members	are	equally	likely	to	be	the	sender	or	receiver	of	a	suggestion.	The
larger	γ	becomes,	the	more	likely	it	becomes	that	agents	with	higher	expectation	standings	in	the	group	become	selected	as	senders	or	receivers	of
suggestions.[2]	In	the	random	interaction	model,	expectation	standings	have	no	effect	on	interaction	probabilities	and	all	agents	are	always	equally	likely	to	be
selected	as	the	sender	or	receiver	of	a	suggestion.
3.12 	After	the	sender	i	and	receiver	j	of	a	suggestion	have	been	selected,	in	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	the	probability	that	j
accept	i's	suggestion	is	equal	to	Eδi/(Eδi	+	Eδj).	The	probability	that	j	will	reject	i's	suggestion	is	equal	to	1	-	Eδi/(Eδi	+	Eδj).	In	both	cases,	δ	(δ	≥	0)	is	an
exogenous	weighting	factor	that	enables	us	to	control	the	extent	to	which	performance	expectations	affect	interactions.	When	δ	=	0,	differences	in	the
performance	expectations	that	group	members	have	for	i	and	j	do	not	affect	their	interaction,	so	that	j	is	equally	likely	to	accept	or	to	reject	i's	suggestion.	The
larger	δ	becomes,	the	more	a	difference	between	Eδi	and	Eδj	to	the	advantage	(disadvantage)	of	i	increases	the	probability	that	j	will	accept	(reject)	i's
suggestion.[3]	Note	that	we	use	here	the	expectation	standings	(Ei)	of	i	and	j,	rather	than	the	performance	expectations	(eij)	that	i	and	j	personally	have	for	each
other.	This	implements	the	notion	that	group	members	tend	to	take	the	performance	expectations	of	other	group	members	into	account	when	interacting	with
each	other.	In	the	random	interaction	model,	expectation	standings	have	no	effect	on	the	outcomes	of	interactions,	so	that	suggestions	are	always	equally	likely
to	be	accepted	or	rejected.
Formation	of	status	beliefs
3.13 	Status	beliefs	can	emerge	from	comprehensive	and	consistent	behavior	interchange	patterns	between	members	of	different	social	categories.	A
comprehensive	and	consistent	association	between	behavior	interchange	patterns	and	differences	in	the	social	distinction	makes	it	possible	that	group
members	acquire	corresponding	status	beliefs.	However,	if	comprehensiveness	and/or	consistency	are	low,	group	members	acquire	no	such	beliefs	and	even
might	lose	existing	beliefs.
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3.14 	We	capture	the	comprehensiveness	of	the	observed	structures	with	the	measure	comp	(0	≤	comp	≤	1).	This	measure	is	calculated	as	the	number	of	dyads	of
agents	who	differ	in	the	social	distinction	and	who	have	interacted	already	(i.e.	the	number	of	ties	bij	between	group	members	who	differ	in	Ni,	regardless	of	the
weight	of	these	ties),	divided	by	the	total	number	of	dyads	of	agents	who	differ	in	the	social	distinction	(regardless	of	whether	they	have	already	interacted	or
not).	With	this	approach,	the	interactions	between	two	group	members	who	differ	in	Ni	provides	only	a	fraction	of	the	information	that	is	potentially	available	for
evaluating	competence	differences	between	members	of	the	different	categories	in	larger	groups.	Accordingly,	if	only	two	group	members	who	differ	in	Ni	have
interacted	so	far,	the	value	of	comp	will	be	low	in	larger	groups.	However,	its	value	increases	as	the	number	of	such	interactions	increases.	It	reaches	its
maximum	when	all	members	of	the	two	categories	in	the	group	have	interacted	at	least	once	with	each	other.
3.15 	We	capture	the	consistency	of	the	observed	interaction	structures	with	the	measure	cons	(−1	≤	cons	≤	1).	This	measure	is	based	on	the	interactions	that	have
occurred	between	agents	who	differ	in	the	social	distinction.	It	assesses	whether	agents	who	belong	to	category	A	appeared	more	often	in	the	higher	or	lower
competence	role	in	their	interactions	with	agents	who	belong	to	category	B.	More	technically,	we	model	cons	as
(3)
where	#bij,A-	and	#bij,A+	are	the	number	of	behavior	interchange	patterns/ties	in	which	agents	who	belong	to	the	category	Ni	=	A	appear	in	the	lower	(−)	or	higher
(+)	competence	role	in	their	interactions	with	members	of	the	category	Ni	=	B	(as	indicated	by	the	directions	of	the	ties	between	them);	#bij,A0	represents
behavior	interchange	patterns	which	are	balanced,	so	that	both	agents	appear	similarly	competent.	The	closer	cons	comes	to	−1,	the	more	often	members	of	the
category	Ni	=	A	appear	in	the	higher	competence	role;	the	closer	it	comes	to	1,	the	more	often	members	of	category	Ni	=	B	appear	in	the	higher	competence
role.
3.16 	Together	comp	and	cons	determine	how	strongly	the	structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	in	the	group	supports	a	status	belief.	We	express	this	support
with	the	measure	r	(−1	≤	r	≤	1),	which	relates	to	comp	and	cons	in	the	following	way:
(4)
Eq.	(4)	implies	that	r	approaches	its	minimal	or	maximal	value	only	when	the	structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	is	maximally	consistent	(cons	=	−1	or
cons	=	1)	and	maximally	comprehensive	(comp	=	1).	When	r	=	−1,	the	observed	structure	maximally	supports	the	belief	that	members	of	category	Ni	=	A	are
more	competent	than	members	of	category	Ni	=	B.	When	r	=	1,	the	observed	structure	maximally	supports	the	belief	that	members	of	category	Ni	=	B	are	more
competent	than	members	of	category	Ni	=	A.	Note	that	Eq.	(4)	creates	some	time	lag	in	the	effect	that	observed	behavior	interchange	patterns	have	on	r.	This
implements	the	notion	that	when	a	particular	status	belief	has	been	supported	for	some	time,	new	information	that	contradicts	it	might	initially	be	conceived	as	a
merely	coincidental	deviation	from	well-established	hierarchical	structures	(cf.	Ridgeway	2000).
3.17 	Finally,	there	is	a	chance	that	agents	acquire	(and	maintain)	a	status	belief	when	the	observed	structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	sufficiently	supports	it.
We	assume	that	agents	perceive	a	given	belief	as	sufficiently	supported	when	the	value	of	r	crosses	the	threshold	c	(with	0	<	c	≤	1),	either	in	the	negative	or
positive	direction.	For	instance,	when	at	time	t	the	value	of	r	is	smaller	than	or	equal	to	−c,	then	the	belief	Si	=	A	is	sufficiently	supported	and	agents	who
currently	hold	no	status	belief	acquire	this	belief	with	probability	a	(with	0	<	a	≤	1).	Yet,	when	at	time	t	the	value	of	r	is	larger	than	−c,	then	the	belief	Si	=	A	is	not
sufficiently	supported	and	agents	who	currently	hold	this	belief	loose	it	with	probability	l	(0	<	l	≤	1).	Similarly,	when	r	is	larger	than	or	equal	to	c,	then	agents	who
currently	hold	no	status	belief	adopt	the	belief	Si	=	B	with	probability	a;	when	r	is	smaller	than	c,	agents	who	currently	hold	this	belief	loose	it	with	probability	l.
This	implies	that	agents	who	hold	a	status	belief	that	is	not	sufficiently	supported	anymore	always	need	to	make	the	transition	through	Si	=	O	before	they	can
acquire	a	new	belief.[4]
The	temporal	ordering	of	interactions
3.18 	In	our	model,	group	interaction	takes	place	in	iterations	that	consist	of	five	steps	that	emulate	the	cycles	shown	in	Figure	1:
1.	 Update	the	performance	expectations	of	all	agents.
2.	 Select	a	sender	and	a	receiver	of	a	suggestion.
3.	 Determine	the	reaction	of	the	receiver.
4.	 Update	behavior	interchange	patterns.
5.	 Update	status	beliefs	of	all	agents.
3.19 	In	the	basic	interaction	model,	the	outcome	of	step	(4)	at	t	is	the	basis	of	step	(1)	at	t+1.	In	the	extended	interaction	model,	the	outcomes	of	steps	(4)	and	(5)	at	t
are	the	basis	of	step	(1)	at	t+1.	In	the	random	interaction	model,	the	outcomes	of	steps	(4)	and	(5)	do	not	feed	back	into	step	(1).	Appendix	B	provides	a
description	of	the	simulation	process	in	pseudo-code.
Computational	Experiments
4.1 	We	aimed	to	assess	the	proposition	that	task	focused	interaction	in	small	groups	has	the	tendency	to	create	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	between
members	of	different	social	categories	and	thereby	leads	to	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs,	even	in	groups	larger	than	dyads.	We	assessed	this	proposition	in
two	experiments.	In	the	first	(main)	experiment,	we	assessed	whether	status	construction	processes	can	lead	to	the	emergence	of	consistent	hierarchical
differentiation	and	status	beliefs	under	realistic	interaction	conditions.	We	also	assessed	how	emergence	is	affected	by	group	size,	the	duration	of	group
interaction,	and	the	possibility	that	status	beliefs	affect	performance	expectations	in	the	context	in	which	they	have	been	acquired.	In	the	second	experiment,	we
conducted	sensitivity	analyses	in	which	we	aimed	to	assess	how	much	model	outcomes	depend	on	the	exact	selection	of	parameter	values.
4.2 	In	all	experiments,	we	focused	on	groups	of	sizes	I	=	2,	I	=	4,	I	=	6,	I	=	8,	and	I	=	10.	The	members	of	these	groups	were	equally	divided	into	the	two	categories
Ni	=	A	and	Ni	=	B	(i.e.	IA	=	IB	=.5I)	.	Initially	no	agent	held	a	status	belief	(i.e.	all	Si	=	O)	and	no	behavior	interchange	patterns	were	established	between	them.	In
real	life,	groups	might	interact	over	varying	time	frames.	We	let	agents	interact	for	2,000	iterations.	This	seemed	long	enough	to	emulate	groups	that	in	real	life
would	interact	over	a	long	period.	Yet,	to	be	able	to	inspect	developments	over	shorter	time	frames,	we	recorded	outcomes	after	each	iteration.
4.3 	In	the	first	experiment,	we	fixed	the	parameters	that	govern	the	concentration	of	interactions	among	higher	status	group	members	(γ)	and	the	effect	that	status
differences	have	on	the	acceptance	and	rejection	of	suggestions	(δ)	to	the	values	2.5	and	1	respectively.	In	the	random	interaction	model	and	the	basic
interaction	model	this	parameterization	creates	interaction	conditions	that	are	in	line	with	our	theoretical	arguments	and	observations	in	empirical	research	(for
example	see	Balkwell	1991a;	Skvoretz	&	Farraro	1996).	That	is,	with	this	parameterization,	differences	in	expectation	standings	among	group	members	lead	to
differences	in	the	probability	with	which	they	will	be	the	initiator	or	receiver	of	a	suggestion,	to	the	benefit	of	individuals	with	higher	expectation	standings.
Furthermore,	the	suggestions	of	individuals	with	higher	expectation	standings	are	more	likely	to	be	accepted	than	suggestions	of	individuals	with	lower
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expectation	standings.	We	had	no	primary	interest	in	the	effects	of	the	threshold	parameter	(c),	the	probability	that	agents	acquire	beliefs	(a),	and	the	probability
that	they	lose	beliefs	(l).	We	therefore	fixed	these	parameters	at	intermediate	values	of	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	We	focused	on	three	outcomes	and	compared	them	across
all	three	model	versions	(i.e.	random	interaction	model,	basic	interaction	model,	and	extended	interaction	model).	First,	we	assessed	the	extent	of	consistent
hierarchical	differentiation	between	members	of	different	social	categories	with	the	absolute	value	of	cons.	Second,	we	assessed	the	stability	of	consistent
hierarchical	differentiation	over	time	by	the	number	of	times	the	value	of	cons	changed	its	sign	during	group	interaction	(i.e.	how	often	cons	changed	from	cons	≤
0	to	cons	>	0	or	from	cons	≥	0	to	cons	<	0).	Third,	we	assessed	the	overall	tendency	for	status	beliefs	to	emerge	with	the	largest	share	of	group	members	that
held	the	same	status	belief	(i.e.	the	largest	set	of	agents	with	the	same	state	on	Si	that	is	Si	≠	O).
4.4 	In	the	second	experiment,	we	first	tested	how	variation	in	the	parameters	γ	and	δ	affects	model	outcomes.	We	only	examined	this	for	the	basic	interaction
model	and	the	extended	interaction	model,	given	that	these	parameters	have	no	effect	on	interactions	in	the	random	interaction	model.	Subsequently,	we
assessed	how	variation	in	the	parameters	c,	a,	and	l	affects	the	outcomes	of	the	extended	interaction	model,	given	that	this	is	the	only	model	in	which	they	can
affect	the	interactions	among	agents.
4.5 	In	order	to	convey	a	better	understanding	of	the	dynamics	that	our	model	generates,	we	start	with	presenting	the	outcomes	of	two	exemplary	simulation	runs.
For	these	runs,	we	used	the	extended	interaction	model	to	illustrate	the	full	range	of	dynamics	that	can	occur.
Exemplary	simulation	runs
4.6 	Figure	2	shows	the	outcome	of	two	simulation	runs	that	ended	with	some	level	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	between	the	members	of	the	two
categories.	In	both	runs,	there	were	six	group	members	who	interacted	for	200	iterations.	The	trace	plot	in	panel	(b)	shows	the	development	of	consistent
hierarchical	differentiation	between	members	of	the	two	categories	(cons)	over	time.	Panels	(a)	and	(c)	show	snapshots	of	the	structure	of	behavior	interchange
patterns	that	developed	in	the	two	groups.
4.7 	After	the	first	ten	iterations	of	the	first	run	(shown	in	panel	(a)),	one	member	of	category	B	appeared	unambiguously	more	competent	in	its	interactions	with	two
members	of	category	A.	By	contrast,	other	members	of	category	B	and	members	of	category	A	appeared	more,	less,	and	equally	competent	in	interactions	with
members	of	the	respective	other	category.	As	the	trace	plot	in	panel	(b)	shows,	an	initial	advantage	for	members	of	category	B	led	to	a	high	level	of	consistency.
This	consistency	decreased	when	some	behavior	interchange	patterns	became	established	in	which	members	of	category	A	appeared	more	or	equally
competent	as	members	of	category	B.	However,	the	initial	advantage	of	members	of	category	B	induced	a	corresponding	status	belief	in	some	group	members.
These	beliefs	fed	back	into	interactions,	so	that	by	iteration	200	more	comprehensive	structures	had	become	established	that	still	supported	the	belief	Si	=	B.
4.8 	In	the	second	run	(shown	in	panel	(c)),	by	iteration	10,	the	structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	was	less	mixed	than	in	the	first	run	and	was	to	the
advantage	of	members	of	category	A.	Over	time,	this	initial	advantage	became	stronger.
Figure	2.	Development	of	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	(cons)	in	two	exemplary	simulation	runs	in	the	extended	interaction	model	over	200
iterations.	Parameter	setting:	I	=	6,	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	γ	=	2.5,	δ	=	1,	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	Triangles	and	circles	represent	agents	for	which	Ni	=	A	and	Ni	=	B	respectively.	Red,
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white,	and	green	coloring	of	agents	represent	Si	=	A,	Si	=	O,	and	Si	=	B	respectively.	A	directed	tie	between	agents	indicates	that	a	behavior	interchange
pattern	(bij)	had	been	established,	in	which	the	source	appears	in	the	higher	competence	role	and	the	sink	appears	in	the	lower	competence	role;	undirected
ties	indicate	balanced	interactions.	Panels	(a)	and	(c):	snapshots	of	behavior	interchange	patterns;	panel	(b):	level	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation
between	members	of	different	social	categories.
4.9 	The	outcomes	of	these	exemplary	simulation	runs	show	that	task	focused	interaction	can	over	time	lead	to	the	creation	of	stable	hierarchical	structures.	These
structures	can	be	aligned	with	differences	in	a	social	distinction	among	group	members.	Our	computational	experiments	enabled	us	to	assess	how	likely	this	is
to	happen	and	to	assess	whether	this	likelihood	depends	on	group	size,	time	frame,	and	on	the	version	of	the	model	that	is	used.
Outcome	of	main	experiment
4.10 	Figures	3	to	5	show	the	outcomes	of	our	computational	experiments	that	aimed	at	assessing	the	emergence	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	and	status
beliefs	based	on	realistic	interaction	probabilities.	The	figures	suggest	that	the	behavioral	processes	that	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended
interaction	model	implement	have	the	tendency	to	induce	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	between	members	of	different	social	categories	and	this
differentiation	leads	to	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs.	This	tendency	is	stronger	in	smaller	groups	and	in	the	early	and	late	phases	of	group	interaction.
Especially	for	larger	groups,	the	behavioral	principles	that	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	implement	make	an	important
difference.	In	larger	groups,	the	random	interaction	model	on	average	hardly	leads	to	belief	emergence.	The	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended
interaction	model,	by	contrast,	generate	substantial	amounts	of	belief	emergence.
4.11 	To	illustrate	the	foregoing	results,	consider	first	the	relation	between	group	size	and	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	shown	in	Figure	3.	Increasing	group
size	beyond	size	two	had	a	strong	negative	effect	on	the	average	level	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	in	all	models.	This	negative	effect	was	strongest
in	the	random	interaction	model,	followed	by	the	basic	interaction	model,	and	the	extended	interaction	model.	In	groups	larger	than	dyads,	the	average	level	of
consistent	differentiation	was	initially	higher	in	the	extended	interaction	model	than	in	the	basic	interaction	model,	but	this	difference	decreased	as	group	size
increased.	The	difference	disappeared	almost	completely	for	groups	of	size	10.
4.12 	The	generally	negative	effect	of	group	size	on	the	level	of	consistency	can	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	in	larger	groups	there	is	a	larger	possibility	for
interactions	among	members	of	different	categories	to	contradict	each	other.	Additionally,	status	accumulation	tends	to	be	weaker	than	in	smaller	groups.	The
reason	is	that	in	larger	groups	interactions	are	often	spread	over	a	larger	number	of	individuals.	This	makes	it	less	likely	that	few,	highly	dominant	actors	emerge
who	might	strongly	influence	patterns	of	differentiation	to	the	benefit	of	their	own	category.	This	is	illustrated	by	Figure	4,	which	shows	that	the	average	number
of	sign	changes	in	cons	tended	to	be	higher	in	larger	groups.	This	indicates	that	the	hierarchical	structures	that	emerge	in	larger	groups	tend	to	be	less	stable
than	in	smaller	groups.
4.13 	The	convergence	of	the	outcomes	of	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	with	increasing	group	size	can	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that
in	larger	groups	status	beliefs	contribute	relatively	less	to	performance	expectations.	In	a	group	of	size	four,	for	example,	a	single	individual	can	appear	in	the
higher	competence	role	in	up	to	3	behavior	interchange	patterns.	In	a	group	of	size	ten,	by	contrast,	this	number	increases	to	9.	Given	the	attenuation	effect
implemented	in	Eq.	(1),	the	relative	amount	of	information	that	status	beliefs	add	to	performance	expectations	in	groups	of	size	ten	therefore	tends	to	be	lower
than	in	groups	of	size	four.	Status	beliefs	thus	tend	to	have	less	effect	on	hierarchy	formation	in	larger	groups	than	in	smaller	groups.
4.14 	Figure	3	shows	that	there	was	an	initial	peak	in	consistency	in	the	early	phases	of	interactions	in	groups	larger	than	two.	In	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the
extended	interaction	model,	this	peak	was	followed	by	a	decrease	and	subsequent	increase	in	consistency.	In	the	random	interaction	model,	the	peak	was
followed	by	a	decrease	that	led	to	a	comparatively	stable,	low	value	of	consistency.	The	initial	peak	that	occurred	in	all	models	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that
in	the	early	phases	of	group	interaction	only	few	group	members	will	have	interacted	with	each	other.	This	leaves	little	room	for	interaction	patterns	that	might
contradict	initial	differentiation	between	members	of	the	two	categories.	The	longer	the	group	interacts,	however,	the	more	likely	there	is	contradicting
information	that	leads	to	a	decrease	in	consistency.	The	subsequent	increase	after	this	initial	decrease	in	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended
interaction	model	is	due	to	the	fact	that	in	these	models		status	accumulation	processes	can	occur	over	time.	These	processes	tend	to	reinforce	any	slight
advantage	to	the	benefit	of	one	category	and	thereby	contribute	to	the	consistency	of	observed	behavior	interchange	patterns.	In	the	random	interaction	model
no	such	reinforcing	processes	exist	and	the	average	level	of	consistency	thus	tends	to	be	low	after	some	interactions	have	taken	place.
4.15 	Note	that	across	model	versions	the	level	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	was	especially	high	in	dyads.	However,	in	the	random	interaction	model,
there	was	more	fluctuation	in	this	outcome	over	time	than	in	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model.	The	generally	high	level	of
consistency	across	model	versions	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	in	groups	of	size	two	any	hierarchical	differentiation	is	necessarily	fully	consistent	with
differences	in	the	social	distinction.	The	fluctuation	in	the	random	interaction	model	is	due	to	the	fact	that	interactions	occur	at	random,	which	means	that	the
history	of	interactions	between	group	members	sometimes	will	be	balanced.	This	implies	that	occasionally	there	is	no	hierarchical	differentiation	between	them
and	this	tends	to	decrease	the	average	absolute	value	of	cons	across	simulation	runs.	The	processes	that	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended
interaction	model	implement,	by	contrast,	lead	to	more	stability	in	hierarchical	differentiation,	even	in	groups	of	size	two.
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Figure	3.	Average	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	(average	value	of	|cons|)	for	different	group	sizes	(I)	in	all	model	versions	over	2,000	iterations.
Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	γ	=	2.5,	δ	=	1,	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent	simulation	runs	per	condition.
Figure	4.	Average	number	of	changes	in	the	sign	of	cons	for	different	group	sizes	(I)	in	all	model	versions	over	2,000	iterations.	Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	γ	=
2.5,	δ	=	1,	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent	simulation	runs	per	condition.
4.16 	Consider	next	the	average	largest	share	of	agents	that	held	a	status	belief,	shown	in	Figure	5.	The	results	parallel	the	results	for	the	level	of	consistent
hierarchical	differentiation	shown	in	Figure	3,	given	that	belief	emergence	is	linked	to	the	level	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation.	That	is,	the	largest	share
of	agents	who	hold	a	status	belief	shortly	peaked	in	the	early	phases	of	the	simulation	process.	In	the	case	of	the	random	interaction	model,	this	peak	was
followed	by	a	decrease	that,	over	time,	leveled	off	to	a	stable,	low	value.	In	the	cases	of	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model,	by
contrast,	the	peak	was	followed	by	a	temporary	decrease	and	a	subsequent	increase.	Over	time,	the	increase	leveled	off	to	a	stable	value	that	was	higher	than
in	the	random	interaction	model.	The	most	striking	finding	is	the	fact	that	in	larger	groups,	the	random	interaction	model	on	average	hardly	led	to	the	emergence
of	status	beliefs.	By	contrast,	in	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model,	there	was	a	substantial	probability	that	agents	acquire	status
beliefs,	especially	in	later	stages	of	group	life.	This	implies	that,	given	the	parameterization	chosen	here,	the	behavioral	process	that	these	models	implement
make	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs	more	likely.
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Figure	5.	Average	largest	share	of	agents	with	the	same	status	belief	(Si	=	A	or	Si	=	B)	for	different	group	sizes	(I)	in	all	model	versions	over	2,000	iterations.
Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	γ	=	2.5,	δ	=	1,	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent	simulation	runs	per	condition.
Outcome	of	sensitivity	analyses
4.17 	Figures	6	and	7	show	the	outcome	of	our	sensitivity	analyses	that	focused	on	the	parameters	that	govern	the	concentration	of	interactions	among	higher	status
group	members	(γ)	and	the	effect	that	status	differences	have	on	the	acceptance	and	rejection	of	suggestions	(δ).	For	brevity,	we	only	show	the	average
absolute	level	of	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	and	the	largest	share	of	agents	with	the	same	status	belief	after	2,000	iterations.	Furthermore,	the
results	in	terms	of	consistency	(Figure	6)	and	belief	emergence	(Figure	7)	are	very	similar,	because	belief	emergence	is	linked	to	consistency	for	a	given	set	of
values	for	c,	a,	and	l.	We	therefore	only	discuss	the	results	for	the	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	in	detail.	For	illustrative	purposes,	we	also	show	the
outcome	of	the	random	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations	from	the	main	experiment.	Note	that	in	this	model	interaction	dynamics	cannot	be	affected	by	the
parameters	γ	and	δ.	We	therefore	use	the	same	comparison	value	across	different	conditions	given	a	certain	group	size	I.
4.18 	Figure	6	suggests	that	in	dyads	the	parameters	γ	and	δ	had	little	effect	on	model	outcomes.	Only	when	δ	was	0,	the	average	absolute	level	of	cons	tended	be
somewhat	lower	than	1.	The	reason	is	that	in	this	case,	differences	in	expectation	standings	between	group	members	cannot	affect	the	likelihood	with	which
they	will	accept/reject	each	other's	suggestions.	This	means	that	the	outcome	of	their	interactions	is	determined	completely	at	random.	As	a	consequence,	the
behavior	of	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	becomes	similar	to	the	behavior	of	the	random	interaction	model.	Figure	6	suggests
that	this	similarity	also	occurs	in	groups	larger	than	two.	That	is,	when	δ	=	0,	the	outcomes	of	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model
hardly	differed	from	the	outcomes	of	the	random	interaction	model.	The	value	of	γ	had	no	effect	on	this	similarity.	It	should	be	noted	though	that	such	a
parameterization	would	be	inconsistent	with	the	theoretical	assumptions	that	we	want	to	implement	with	this	model,	given	that	under	this	condition	differences	in
expectation	standings	among	group	members	do	not	affect	the	likelihood	with	which	their	suggestions	will	be	accepted.
4.19 	When	the	value	of	δ	was	larger	than	0,	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	created	higher	levels	of	consistency	than	the	random
interaction	model.	Furthermore,	the	difference	between	the	basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	depended	on	how	much	δ	was	larger
than	0,	especially	in	larger	groups.	The	potential	reasons	for	this	are	the	weaker	tendency	towards	status	accumulation	in	larger	groups	and	the	relatively
smaller	differences	that	status	beliefs	create	in	expectation	standings	in	such	groups.	Under	such	conditions,	even	small	status	differences	(as	induced	by
status	beliefs)	need	to	have	a	strong	impact	on	interactions	(i.e.	higher	values	of	δ	are	required)	in	order	to	increase	consistency.
4.20 	Furthermore,	the	value	of	γ	generally	had	little	effect	on	model	outcomes.	A	possible	reason	for	this	is	that	values	of	δ	>	0	make	it	more	likely	that	agents	who
have	a	status	advantage	will	maintain	this	advantage	in	subsequent	interactions.	Thus,	any	interaction	across	the	boundary	of	the	social	distinction	that	involves
status	advantaged	and	status	disadvantaged	actors	is	likely	to	bolster	existing	status	differences.	As	a	consequence,	it	matters	relatively	little	whether	or	not
interactions	are	concentrated	among	higher	status	group	members.
Figure	6.	Average	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	(average	value	of	|cons|)	for	different	group	sizes	(I),	different	levels	of	concentration	of	interactions
among	higher	status	group	members	(γ),	and	different	levels	of	the	effect	that	status	differences	have	on	the	acceptance	and	rejection	of	suggestions	(δ)	in	the	basic
interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations.	Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent
simulation	runs	per	condition.	The	dotted	line	provides	the	average	outcome	of	the	random	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations	in	the	main	experiment	as	a
reference	value.
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Figure	7.	Average	largest	share	of	agents	with	the	same	status	belief	(Si	=	A	or	Si	=	B)	for	different	group	sizes	(I),	different	levels	of	concentration	of	interactions
among	higher	status	group	members	(γ),	and	different	levels	of	the	effect	that	status	differences	have	on	the	acceptance	and	rejection	of	suggestions	(δ)	in	the	basic
interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations.	Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	c	=	a	=	l	=	.5.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent
simulation	runs	per	condition.	The	dotted	line	provides	the	average	outcome	of	the	random	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations	in	the	main	experiment	as	a
reference	value.
4.21 	Figures	8	and	9	show	the	effect	that	variation	in	the	threshold	parameter	(c)	and	in	the	parameters	that	govern	belief	acquisition	(a)	and	loss	(l)	had	on	model
outcomes.	In	the	case	of	consistency	(Figure	8)	we	also	show	the	outcome	of	the	random	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations	from	the	main	experiment.
Again,	this	comparison	value	is	stable	across	conditions	for	a	given	group	size	I,	given	that	c,	a,	and	l	cannot	affect	interactions	in	this	version	of	the	model.	In
the	case	of	the	largest	share	of	agents	with	the	same	status	belief	(Figure	9),	by	contrast,	we	show	comparison	values	from	simulation	runs	based	on	the
random	interaction	model	at	different	values	of	c,	a,	and	l.	The	reason	is	that	these	parameters	can	affect	belief	emergence	in	this	model,	even	if	beliefs	cannot
affect	interactions.
4.22 	The	results	shown	in	Figure	8	suggest	that	only	c	had	an	effect	on	model	outcomes	in	terms	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation,	by	reducing	the	average
absolute	level	of	cons.	The	reason	is	that	when	c	is	high,	the	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	in	a	group	needs	to	be	high	before	agents	can	acquire
status	beliefs.	When	a	group	has	reached	this	state,	there	is	little	room	left	for	status	beliefs	to	contribute	to	even	higher	levels	of	consistency.	Similarly,	the
results	shown	in	Figure	9	suggest	that	that	only	c	had	an	effect	on	model	outcomes	in	terms	of	belief	emergence.	Generally,	the	more	consistent	hierarchical
differentiation	needs	to	favor	one	of	the	two	categories	before	agents	can	acquire	(or	maintain)	status	beliefs,	the	less	likely	beliefs	are	to	emerge	in	both	the
random	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model.	Yet,	at	a	given	level	of	c,	the	processes	that	the	extended	interaction	model	implements	still
made	belief	emergence	more	likely	than	in	the	random	interaction	model,	unless	both	group	size	and	the	threshold	parameter	were	comparatively	large/high	(i.e.
I	=	10	and	c	=	.75).
4.23 	Taken	together,	the	results	of	our	sensitivity	analyses	suggest	that	our	main	findings	hold	over	a	large	area	of	the	parameter	space.	If	δ	is	larger	than	0,	the
basic	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	tend	to	create	higher	levels	of	consistency	than	the	random	interaction	model.	The	larger	δ
becomes,	the	stronger	this	tendency	becomes	in	the	extended	interaction	model	compared	to	the	basic	interaction	model,	especially	in	larger	groups.	Higher
values	of	c	tend	to	decrease	the	levels	of	consistency	and	belief	emergence	in	the	extended	interaction	model,	but	still	this	model	tends	to	show	higher	average
levels	of	both	outcomes	than	the	random	interaction	model	for	most	parameter	combinations.
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Figure	8.	Average	consistency	of	hierarchical	differentiation	(average	value	of	|cons|)	for	different	group	sizes	(I),	different	levels	of	the	threshold	for	belief	acquisition
(c),	and	different	probabilities	that	belief	acquisition	(a)	or	loss	( l)	occur	in	the	extended	interaction	model	after	2,000	iterations.	Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	γ	=
2.5	and	δ	=	1.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent	simulation	runs	per	condition.	The	dotted	line	provides	the	average	outcome	of	the	random	interaction	model
after	2,000	iterations	in	the	main	experiment	as	a	reference	value.
Figure	9.	Average	largest	share	of	agents	with	the	same	status	belief	(Si	=	A	or	Si	=	B)	for	different	group	sizes	(I),	different	levels	of	the	threshold	for	belief
acquisition	(c),	and	different	probabilities	that	belief	acquisition	(a)	or	loss	( l)	occur	in	the	random	interaction	model	and	the	extended	interaction	model	after	2,000
iterations.	Parameter	setting:	IA	=	IB	=	.5I,	γ	=	2.5	and	δ	=	1.	Averages	are	based	on	200	independent	simulation	runs	per	condition.
Discussion	and	Conclusion
5.1 	We	contributed	to	research	on	the	social	construction	of	status	characteristics	by	investigating	how	interaction	in	task	focused	groups	larger	than	dyads	can
create	the	conditions	necessary	for	the	emergence	of	status	beliefs.	Earlier	research	suggests	that	the	observation	of	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation
between	members	of	two	different	social	categories	can	create	the	belief	that	members	of	one	category	are	more	competent	than	members	of	the	other
category,	even	when	this	objectively	is	not	the	case.	Based	on	related	research	in	the	expectation	states	framework,	we	have	developed	an	agent-based
computational	model	that	enabled	us	to	examine	the	conditions	under	which	task	focused	interaction	might	spontaneously	create	such	consistency	and	thereby
might	lead	to	the	emergence	of	stats	beliefs.
5.2 	Our	computational	experiments	suggest	that	small	group	interaction	might	have	a	tendency	to	spontaneously	create	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation
between	members	of	different	social	categories,	even	in	groups	larger	than	dyads.	This	tendency	might	even	exist	when	status	beliefs	do	not	affect
performance	expectations	in	the	contexts	in	which	they	have	emerged.	Moreover,	the	emergence	of	consistent	differentiation	might	be	more	likely	in	smaller
groups	than	in	larger	groups,	and	in	groups	that	interact	for	a	very	short	or	very	long	time.	Finally,	as	groups	become	larger,	the	reinforcing	effect	that	newly
created	status	beliefs	can	have	on	consistent	hierarchical	differentiation	might	become	weaker.
5.3 	Our	study	shows	that	task	focused	interaction	in	small	groups	might	be	a	potent	force	in	the	creation	of	status	beliefs,	also	if	groups	contain	more	than	two
members.	Future	research	can	build	on	and	extend	our	model	in	several	ways.	First,	we	have	not	investigated	the	mechanisms	related	to	status	beliefs	crossing
group	boundaries.	Future	research	might	investigate	how	the	processes	involved	in	the	creation	of	status	beliefs,	as	presented	here,	relate	to	their	diffusion
throughout	society.	To	this	end,	the	simulation	model	could	be	extended	to	include	a	larger	number	of	agents	that	can	join/leave	different	groups	of	different
sizes	for	different	durations.
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5.4 	Second,	in	line	with	existing	research	in	SCT,	we	have	focused	on	social	distinctions	that	create	two	categories	of	individuals.	In	real	life,	group	members	might
be	differentiated	by	social	distinctions	that	create	more	than	two	categories	and	this	might	increase	the	complexity	of	the	interactional	dynamics	that	unfold.
Extending	our	model	to	allow	for	more	than	two	categories	could	provide	researchers	with	a	lever	to	study	the	implications	of	this	additional	complexity.
However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	to	date	there	is	little	knowledge	about	the	cognitive	processes	that	underlie	status	construction	processes	in	the	presence	of
more	than	two	categories.	Including	the	notion	that	there	can	be	more	than	two	categories	should	therefore	proceed	in	close	interaction	with	empirical	research.
5.5 	Third,	similar	to	earlier	models	of	hierarchical	differentiation	in	small	groups	(e.g.,	Skvoretz	&	Fararo	1996),	in	our	model	a	single	interaction	between	two	group
members	can	be	sufficient	to	establish	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	between	them	and	thereby	can	potentially	lead	to	the	formation	of	status	beliefs.	It	is	an
empirical	question	how	many	interactions	between	two	individuals	it	takes	before	individuals	actually	perceive	competence	differences	between	them.	Future
research	could	conduct	detailed	empirical	experiments	to	directly	calibrate	this	(and	other)	model	aspect(s).	Yet,	since	earlier	models	using	similar	assumptions
generated	hierarchical	structures	congruent	with	empirical	data	(Skvoretz	&	Fararo	1996),	this	simplifying	assumption	seems	sufficient	for	our	purposes.
5.6 	Finally,	a	central	outcome	of	interest	in	earlier	work	on	hierarchy	formation	in	small	groups	is	the	formation	of	transitive	hierarchies	(e.g.,	Skvoretz	&	Fararo
1996;	Skvoretz	et	al.	1996).	In	our	work,	we	have	explored	the	possibility	that	status	beliefs	might	affect	the	interactions	in	the	very	group	context	in	which	they
had	been	acquired.	Future	research	might	provide	interesting	new	insights	into	how	this	possibility	might	affect	the	formation	of	fully	transitive	hierarchies	in
groups	whose	members	are	differentiated	in	a	salient	social	distinction.	It	seems	likely	that	in	such	groups,	the	reinforcing	effects	of	status	beliefs,	once	they
have	emerged,	also	facilitate	the	emergence	of	fully	transitive	structures.
Appendix	A:	Formal	representations	of	performance	expectations
	6.1 	In	empirical	research,	formal	representations	of	the	formation	of	performance	expectations	are	based	on	graph	representations	in	which	individuals	are
differentially	linked	to	task	outcomes.	Such	representations	were	introduced	by	Berger	et	al.	(1977);	Fisek	et	al.	(1991)	subsequently	incorporated	behavior
interchange	patterns,	and	Ridgeway	(2000)	incorporated	elements	of	status	construction.	The	notation	that	we	use	here	in	this	appendix	is	slightly	different	than
in	the	main	part	of	the	article	to	facilitate	comparison	with	the	original	formulations.
6.2 	Panels	(a)	and	(b)	of	Figure	A1	show	an	elementary	group	task	situation	that	includes	two	persons	i	and	j	who	differ	in	their	status	beliefs.	The	task	is
represented	by	T	and	its	possible	outcomes,	success	(T(+))	and	failure	(T(-)).	To	achieve	success,	the	task	requires	one	instrumental	ability	(C*),	whereas
group	members	can	either	possess	the	high	state	(C*(+))	or	the	low	state	(C*(-))	of	this	ability	(e.g.,	high	vs.	low	mathematical	skills	in	the	case	of	a	math
problem).	The	relevance	of	C*	for	T	is	indicated	by	a	tie	between	their	different	states,	so	that	the	high	state	of	C*	is	connected	to	success	and	its	low	state	is
connected	to	failure.	Furthermore,	there	is	a	nominal	characteristic	(N)	that	distinguishes	group	members	into	two	categories	(Na	and	Nb)	which	can	be	thought
of	as	gender	(man/woman)	or	skin	color	(white/black).	Panel	(a)	shows	the	situation	from	i's	point	of	view;	i	holds	the	belief	that	members	of	category	Na	are
more	competent	than	members	of	category	Nb	(resulting	in	corresponding	perceptions	of	highly,	i.e.	Na(+),	and	lowly,	i.e.	Nb(-),	evaluated	states	of	the
characteristic).	For	i,	Na(+)	and	Nb(-)	thus	induce	differences	in	generalized	performance	expectations	(Γ)	that	connect	both	persons	via	C*	to	task	outcomes.
However,	as	illustrated	in	panel	(b),	j	does	not	believe	that	N	signifies	differences	in	competence.	For	j,	Na	and	Nb	are	thus	neither	evaluated	differently,	nor
connected	to	the	task.
Figure	A1.	Graph	representations	of	status	structures	in	two	person	group	task	situation.	Individuals	are	represented	as	i	and	j.	There	is	a	nominal	characteristic	N
with	two	states	(Na	and	Nb).	Panel	(a):	individual	i's	point	of	view;	i	perceives	N	as	a	status	characteristic	so	that	it	is	connected	to	generalized	performance
expectations	Γ	which	are	connected	to	differences	in	the	task	ability	C*	that	is	required	for	the	task	T.	Panel	(b):	individual	j's	point	of	view;	j	does	not	perceive	N	as	a
status	characteristic.
6.3 	Fisek	et	al.	(1991)	incorporated	into	this	behavior	interchange	patterns,	as	illustrated	in	panels	(a)	and	(b)	of	Figure	A2.	Imagine	that	i	and	j	already	worked	for
some	time	on	the	common	task	and	that	during	their	interactions	j	consistently	accepted	i's	suggestions,	whereas	 i	consistently	rejected	j's	suggestion.	This
observation	activates	in	both	individuals	the	perception	of	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	(b)	in	which	i	holds	the	positively	evaluated	state	(b(+)),	whereas	j
holds	the	negatively	evaluated	state	(b(-)).	These	states	activate	like-signed	status	typifications	(B(+),	i.e.	leader,	and	B(-),	i.e.	follower)	that	connect	both
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individuals	via	abstract	task	abilities	(Y)	to	task	outcomes.
Figure	A2.	Graph	representations	of	status	structures	in	two	person	group	task	situation	in	which	behavior	interchange	patterns	b	have	been	activated.	Panel	(a):
individual	i	appears	in	the	superior	role	(b(+))	in	her	interactions	with	j.	Panel	(b):	the	observation	that	i	appears	in	the	superior	role	induces	in	i	and	j	the	perception
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that	N	is	connected	to	T,	given	that	i	and	j	differ	in	N.
6.4 	Finally,	as	illustrated	in	panel	(b)	of	Figure	A2,	Ridgeway	(2000)	suggested	that	the	link	between	different	states	of	N	and	Γ	can	become	activated	by	the
observation	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	between	individuals	who	differ	in	N.	In	Figure	A2	this	is	the	case,	given	that	i,	who	is	Na,	holds	the	positive	element
of	a	behavior	interchange	pattern	with	j,	who	is	Nb.	This	potentially	induces	in	both	i	and	j	the	belief	that	Nas	are	generally	more	competent	than	Nbs.	In	total
there	are	three	different	beliefs	possible,	leading	to	the	following	evaluations	of	N:	Na/Nb,	Na(+)/Na(-),	Na(-)/Na(+).
6.5 	Berger	et	al.	(1977)	developed	a	method	with	which	the	relative	performance	expectations	that	group	members	have	for	each	other	can	be	estimated	from
graph	structures.	The	first	step	consists	of	counting	the	number	of	positive	and	negative	paths	of	various	lengths	(l)	that	connect	individuals	to	task	outcomes.
Path	signs	are	determined	by	multiplication	of	the	signs	of	all	ties	that	link	a	given	person	to	task	outcomes	and	the	sign	of	the	task	outcome	to	which	it	is
connected,	whereas	all	ties	are	assumed	positive	unless	they	are	explicitly	negative.	In	panel	(a)	of	Figure	A1,	i	is	connected	to	T	by	two	positive	paths	of	length
4	and	5,	whereas	j	is	connected	to	T	by	two	negative	paths	length	4	and	5.	Note	that	there	is	a	negative	dimensionality	tie	between	Na	and	Nb.
6.6 	In	a	second	step,	these	paths	aggregate	to	performance	expectations	for,	for	instance,	actor	i	(ei)	by	the	rule	(cf.	Berger	et	al.	1977;	Fisek	et	al.	1991):
(A1)
with
(A1a)
and
(A1b)
6.7 	where	e+i	and	e-i	represent	the	combined	sets	of	positive	and	negative	paths.	The	precise	numerical	values	with	which	paths	of	different	length	enter	(A1a)	and
(A1b)	are	determined	by	the	function	f(l).	Although	several	functional	forms	have	been	specified	in	the	literature,	the	values	they	predict	for	paths	of	a	given
length	differ	only	marginally.	All	functional	forms	have	in	common	that	longer	paths	contribute	less	to	the	formation	of	performance	expectations	than	shorter
ones,	and	this	diminishing	effect	increases	the	longer	the	paths	become.	Paths	longer	than	6	are	generally	assumed	to	provide	no	performance	relevant
information	for	individuals	and	are	therefore	neglected.	We	rely	here	on	the	functional	form	suggested	by	Balkwell	(1991b),	because	the	values	it	predicts	are	in
good	accordance	with	empirical	data.	Thus,	we	assume	that	f(4)	=	.150380,	and	f(5)	=	.049779.	In	order	to	obtain	Eq.	(1),	it	is	helpful	to	note	that	Eq.	(A1a)	and
Eq.	(A1b)	are	equivalent	to
(A2a)
and
(A2b)
where	lL+i	and	lL-i	indicate	the	number	of	positive	and	negative	paths	of	a	given	length	(Balkwell	1991b).	Given	that	we	only	consider	nominal	characteristics
and	behavior	interchange	patterns,	the	only	paths	that	can	be	obtained	are	of	the	lengths	4	and	5.	We	can	thus	reduce	the	foregoing	equations	to
(A3a)
and
(A3b)
6.8 	Substituting	Balkwell's	(1991b),	path	weights	into	these	equations	and	substituting	the	resulting	equations	for	e+i	and	e-i	into	Eq.	(A1),	we	obtain
(A4)
which	can	be	simplified	to
(A5)
6.9 	Finally,	in	our	model,	a	connection	to	a	positive	status	element	(i.e.	N(+)	and	b(+))	always	induces	one	positive	path	of	length	4	and	one	positive	path	of	length
5;	a	connection	to	a	negative	status	element	(i.e.	N(-)	and	b(-))	always	induces	one	negative	path	of	length	4	and	one	negative	path	of	length	5.	As	a
consequence,	l4+i	=	l5+i	and	l4-i	=	l5-i.	It	is	therefore	sufficient	to	simply	count	the	number	of	positive	(#posi)	and	negative	status	elements	(#negi)	to	which	a
given	i	is	connected	(i.e.	the	number	of	N(+)/b(+)	or	N(-)/b(-)	to	which	a	tie	from	i	exists)	and	substitute	the	resulting	numbers	into	the	following	equation:
(A6)
When	generalized	to	the	case	in	which	each	group	member	can	hold	a	private	expectation	for	each	group	member	that	can	differ	from	that	of	other	group
members,	we	obtain	Eq.	(1)	in	the	main	part	of	the	article.	For	simplicity,	we	rounded	the	value	of	.807327	to	.8.
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	Notes
	1Ridgeway	and	Balckwell	(1997)	have	developed	a	model	of	status	construction	theory	that	also	accommodates	groups	larger	than	dyads.	However,	in	this
model	status	beliefs	cannot	emerge	without	an	objective	association	between	the	social	distinction	and	valuable	resources.	Our	modeling	efforts	focus	on	the
spontaneous	emergence	of	status	beliefs	in	the	absence	of	such	an	association.
2This	approach	to	modelling	the	distribution	of	dyadic	interactions	in	discussion	groups	is	a	simplified	version	of	the	approach	presented	by	Skvoretz	and
Farraro	(1996)	for	studying	the	emergence	of	hierarchies	in	real	life	groups.
3This	approach	to	modelling	dyadic	interaction	is	a	simplified	version	of	approaches	used	to	estimate	acceptance	and	rejection	rates	in	dyadic	interactions	as,
for	example,	presented	by	Balkwell	(1991a;	see	his	Eq.	(7)	on	page	359).
4This	approach	to	modeling	changes	in	status	beliefs	is	similar	to	the	approach	used	by	Mark	et	al.	( 2009).	Note	that	agents	always	perceive	the	observed
structure	of	behavior	interchange	patterns	in	the	same	way,	but	that	this	does	not	necessarily	imply	that	they	always	hold	the	same	status	belief.	Instead,	belief
acquisition	is	a	stochastic	process,	in	which	two	agents	might	or	might	not	acquire	the	same	belief	given	the	same	observation	of	behavior	interchange	patterns.
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